The Instruction on Respect for Human Life (1987) , issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, attracted considerable negative as well as positive criticism at the time of its publication. The positive criticism included an excellent commentary in the Australian Lutheran Theological Journa /. l The negative criticism came as much from within the Church as it did from without.
Those who hoped that the Vatican would allow in vitro fertilization with embryo transfer (IVF) as a means of treating certain forms of human infertility, if only in the "simple case", were particularly disappointed.
That disappointment was reflected in an anonymous critique of the document published in The TableT (March 14, 1987: 271) .
This critique rejects the Instruction's "thoroughgoing indentification of the embryo as a human person"2 because, th e writer says, it enables the Instruction to "speak as though the doctor and the zygote are on the same level and have the same rights. " . 1 Th e Ta hie T went on to make other criticis ms as well. But it is the question of th e moral status of the embryonic human being and its implications for IVFtechnology which the present writer wishes to discuss in the light of the Vatican's Instruction on Respect for Human Life.
As to the general thrust of the Instruction , I would agree with the following statement: But given the Church's consistent teaching on contraception as enshrined in 'H uman ae Vitae' the Church could not come to any different conclusion with o ut calling into question the teaching of 'Humanae Vitae'. This new Instruction is consistent with the principles and arguments of 'Humanae Vitae." I also accept the validity of Dr. Peter Riga's observation that the Instruction " is really a compilation of authentic but non-infallible teachings of various popes, councils. and other historicall y authoritative statements by the bishops of Rome."5 The criticisms I wish to make are that the Instruction is, on one key issue , imprecise and misleading, and on another issue, does not go far enough in its appreciation of IYF in the "simple case".
To begin, we need to return to the criticism that the Instruction makes such a thorough identification of the embryo as a human person that it speaks as though the doctor and the zygote are on the same level and have the same rights.
This criticism would not appear to be ajustifiable one, given the precise terms in which the Instruction expresses itself.
In quoting from its 1974 Declaration on Procured Abortion. the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (SCDF) affirms that "from the time that the ovum is fertili zed , a new life is begun which is neither that of the father nor of the mother; ... Right from fertilization is begun the adventure of a human life, and each of its great capacities requires time ... to find its place and to be in a position to act". (, In referring to "capacities", each of which "requires time ... to find its place and to be in a position to act", the SCDF is careful to avoid speaking of the doctor and the zygote as if they were on the same level. Further, there is no suggestion of a general equivalence of rights between doctor and embryo. It depends on what are the rights to which reference is made . Particular reference is made, in the Instruction . only to the right to live and to develop since the exercise of no other rights by an embryo is possible.
The Instruction then goes on to insist that "from the moment the zygote has formed" it "demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality. The human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that same moment his rights as a person must be recognised, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life."7 Beginning of 'Unique Human Life' That a unique human life begins at fertilization has been attested to by contemporary scientific knowledge. In a statement to the Australian Senate Select Committee on the Human Embryo Experimentation Bill 1985, the then head of the Reproductive Medicine Unit of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Adelaide in the State of South Australia said:
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In si mple and reali stic terms it is clear that a biological entity capable of unique human development has not arisen prior to fertilisation of the egg with the sperm . Therefore neither the egg nor the sperm have a special significance in terms of their individual capacit y for a separate human being. From the time of fertilisation onwards the embryo has the capacity for further development as an individual human being provided this is not interrupted by natural intervention such as spontaneous abortion, a major complication of pregnancy or interruption of the pregnancy by artificial means which threatens the well-being of the foetus. Therefore il would seem logical to infer that another human life begins 01 the time offertilisation. If this proposition is accepted then the next point of consideration relates to the rights and status of the human embryo from the point of fertilisation. [ The Senate Select Committee went on to conclude that the respect due to the embryo from the process of fertilisation onwards requires it s protection from destructive non-therapeutic experimentation .... The Committee recommends that the principle protecting the embryo from destructive non-therapeutic experimentation be adopted by the Senate in its consideration of this matter. 10 Such a conclusion from a secular government committee is in complete accord with the public policy advocated by the Vatican Instruction. At the time of writing, the Australian Parliament has not yet adopted legislation which would give effect to the recommendation.
Another way of expressing the same truth, but in religious language, may be found in the writings of the great Lutheran pastor, theologian and martyr, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was killed by the Nazis in 1945. 11 Bodily life, which we receive without any action on our own part, carries within itself the right of its own preservation. This is not a right that we have justly or unjustly appropriated to ourse lves , but it is in the strictest sense an ' innate' right , one which we have passively received and which preexists our will, a right which rests upon the nature of things as they are. Since it is God's will that there should be human life on earth only in the form of bodily life, it follows that it is for the sake of the whole man that the body possesses the right to be preserved. And since all rights are eXlinguished 01 death. itfollows that the preservation of the life of the body is thefoundation of all natural rights without exception and is. therefore invested with a particular importance. The underlying right of natural life is the safeguarding of nature against intentional injury, violation and ki lling. That may sound very jejune and unheroic. But the body does not exist primarily in order to be sacrificed, but in order that it may be preserved. Different and more exalted considerations may give rise to the right or the duty of sacrificing the body, but this in itself presupposes the underlying right to the conservation of bodily life .
[my emphasis] "
In holding to the inviolable right of the embryonic human being to live and to develop, the Instruction is in harmony with the Catholic Church's consistent moral tradition, clarified and refined as that tradition undoubtedly has been in light of the scientific facts as they have become known.
It is the application of that fundamental moral teaching to contemporary biomedical technological developments that the Instruction, at certain points, lacks a clarity and precision which leads it to say too little rather than too much.
Term Causes Confusion
The first major confusion is in the use of the term "abortion" in relation to "the destruction of human beings" in the regular practice of I VF and ET.13 This destruction of human beings involves the fact that nearly 60% of embryos generated in vitro are regarded as non-viable and accordingly discarded. 14 Added to this is the fact that "cryopreservation damages 75 % of embryos (about 50% are destroyed) such that the total wastage of embryos from IVF and ET after cryopreservation can be estimated ... at 96%. "1 5 Since the development of our knowledge about embryos created in vitro comes about by using human embryos as experimental objects, both in their creation and in their manipulation, 16 we are looking at a method of treatment of infertility which is highly experimental and "enormously wasteful of human life". 17 These manipulations, resulting in the deaths of human embryos are not the moral equivalent of induced abortion. There are several distinguishing features between abortion on the one hand and destructive manipulations of human embryos on the other, such that it is arguable that it is the latter which is the greater evil.
The differences between the two sets of circumstances are:
I.
A woman does not set out to get pregnant in order to have an abortion. In the case of IYF, embryos are created precisely as objects of destructi ve experimental and non-therapeutic procedures. I.
2.
Abortion involves the conflict of rights between the woman and her unborn child. That conflict may be resolved by considering the woman's rights to be always more significant than the right of the child to live. This resolution is, in my view, morally wrong and represents the most serious disregard for the moral rights of the fetus . Nevertheless, one recognizes that it is an attempt to resolve a conflict.
3.
In the case of destructive, non-therapeutic interventions on a human embryo, scientists are dealing with human individuals who are in conflict with nobody. They represent no threat to any right (no matter how trivial or derivative) of any other human person . They are finally isolated human persons.
These differences in circumstances make such procedures against innocent embryonic human beings a greater moral evil for which nothing can be said in mitigation of the moral blame to be attached to such acts.
Even in the so-called "simple case" of the homologous IVF and ET procedure to which the Instruction refers, 18 the serious moral blame for the destruction of human pre-implantation embryos is not eliminated as the Instruction surmises it might be.
The fact is that human fertilization in vitro is seriously flawed tec hn o logically because about 60% of the embryos so created are nonvia ble . 14 The med ical technologists are morally responsible for every human embryo which does not implant.
In th e case of normal sexual inte rcourse between husband and wife, a la rge number of em bryos appear not to deve lop and come to birth. 19 This has led scientists to take the view that nature is "ve ry prodigal with respect to e mbryo 10SS".~1I They then conclude that if nature is "very prodigal", it should not matt e r th at there is an equa lly large (but in reality much larger) embryo loss in lYF with ET.~I The truth is . though. that na ture is 100% wasteful of human beings . Every human being di es. It would no t follow from that und e niablefact tha t we are free to kill other individuals. or to be have in a way which is reck lessl y indifferent to the ir ri g ht to li ve. Indeed we would ordinarily s uppose that reckless behavior lead ing to the deaths of others is not only immoral. but ought to be consid ered criminal within the meaning of the law.
If a person dies of natural ca us es. we do not suppose that anyone is m o rall y culpable for that death . And perso ns may die at a ny time from soo n after fertilization to more tha n 100 years after birth .
But if a person dies beca use of other people's manipulation of the m . then that is not a morally neutral event. The fact that medical scientists choose to cause human beings to come into existence through artificial means (lYF technology) implies that they must accept re s ponsibility for what ha ppens to those em bryonic human beings who are in their care. It follows that th e deaths of s uch embryos in the lYF / ET procedure are the respo nsibilit y of those involved.
Responsibility for Embryo Loss
Eve n in the so-called "simple case" there is substantial embryo loss -a loss for which th ose in vo lved must a ccept responsibility. Afte r all. we know in advance that lYF / ET. being ve ry flawed and imperfect technologies. will occas ion th e deaths of most of the embryos so formed. To proceed to I Y F / ET in t he current state of knowledge is to beha ve in a ma nn e r reckless ly indifferent to the plight of the embryos. in the hope that a woman will become pregnant.
When the Instruction refe rs to the "simple case" as a " homologous lYF and ET procedure that is free of any compromise with the abortive practice of destroying e mbryos ... ". it o bsc ures the significant moral difference betwee n abortion and the destruction of pre-implantation embryos and fails to distinguish between na tura l wastage and the wastage of embryos caused by huma n intervention which is not m o ra lly neutral.
It need s also to be pointed out that the formation of embryos in vitro is not necessary since it is not don e to save the li ves of the mothers concerned. lYF may alleviate infe rtilit y in a bout 14% of the women who come to an IYFclinic Y but thecost of that alleviation of infertility in terms of embryo loss, even in the "simple case". is morally unacceptable .
The Instruction, however, is very clear in pointing out that the basis of the moral indifference to the essential right of embryonic human beings to live is in the very nature of the procedures involved .
Homologous IVF and ET is brought about outside the bodies of the couple through action of third parties whose competence and technical activity determine the success of the procedure. Such fertiliza tion entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin and des tiny of the person. Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity and equality that must be common to parents a nd children. [my emphasis]23 Apart from its lack of clarity and precision at certain points as suggested above, the Instruction is a timely reminder to the world that the gift of human life is God's gift, and that many contemporary reproductive technologies are carried out in a way which is indifferent to that gift and which attacks the integrity of marital intimacy as the means by which God intends procreation to occur.
If criticism can be made of the Instruction it is , in this writer's view, that the I nstruction did not go quite far enough in the terms of its rejection of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer.
